Incomplete Contract,Asymmetric Information and Incentive to Cooperative Operators:Construction and Application of Principal-Agent Model of Farmer Cooperatives

TAN Zhi-xin, KONG Xiang-zhi

Journal of Renmin University of China ›› 2011 ›› Issue (5) : 34-42.

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主管：教育部
主办：中国人民大学
ISSN 1000-5420  CN 11-1476/C
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Journal of Renmin University of China ›› 2011 ›› Issue (5) : 34-42.

Incomplete Contract,Asymmetric Information and Incentive to Cooperative Operators:Construction and Application of Principal-Agent Model of Farmer Cooperatives

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